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Polities di⁄er in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out
promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a
divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture
control of the legislature and the ex post incentives facing individual legislators, whose
interests may be more parochial. We study how di⁄erences in ￿party discipline￿shape
￿scal policy choices. In particular, we examine the determinants of national spending
on local public goods in a three-stage game of campaign rhetoric, voting, and legislative
decision-making. We ￿nd that the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel spending, and also
the e¢ ciency of the spending regime, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the degree of
party discipline.
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How do political institutions a⁄ect economic policy choices? This question frames much
recent research in comparative political economics. Whereas political scientists working in
comparative politics have long addressed the implications of di⁄erent political institutions for
political outcomes￿ such as the number of political parties, the stability of government, and
the representation of minorities￿ political economists have more recently become interested
in the institutional determinants of policy outcomes such as income tax rates, national and
local public spending, and industry rates of trade protection.
Much of the work on comparative political economy focuses on aspects of ￿scal policy. For
example, Persson et al. (2000) study the di⁄erences between presidential and parliamentary
political systems for the provision of local public goods and the redistribution of income via
transfer programs. Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2001, ch. 8), and Milesi-
Ferreti et al. (2002) compare taxes, spending and transfers in polities with majoritarian and
proportionally representative (PR) electoral rules. Austen-Smith (2000) examines how tax
and spending policies vary with the number of political parties represented in the law-making
body.
We too are interested in the forces that shape ￿scal policy, but we focus on a di⁄erent
political institutional feature. We note that polities di⁄er in the extent to which political
parties can pre-commit before elections to carry out certain policy actions if they take power.
Commitment problems arise due to a divergence between ex ante and ex post incentives,
which may re￿ ect (among other things) a di⁄erence in the objectives of national parties that
seek to capture control of the legislature and thereby implement their ideological agendas
and the objectives of individual legislators, whose interests may be more parochial. At one
extreme, as in the ￿Downsian￿world, a party may be able to announce a policy platform
to which its members will be fully committed if elected. At the opposite extreme, as with
the ￿citizen-candidates￿of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), the
campaign promises of the political parties may be wholly non-binding. In between these
extremes, the extent to which the political parties can tie the hands of the politicians who
are subsequently elected to o¢ ce will depend on institutional characteristics of the political
regime, such as the role of the national party in ￿nancing regional campaigns, in allocating
the perquisites of election, and in choosing candidates for higher o¢ ce.
For lack of a better term, we shall refer to the institutional variation that is of interest
here as di⁄erences in ￿party discipline.￿We acknowledge that party discipline most often is
used by political scientists and others to mean the extent to which parties (or the leaders
of a legislative delegation) can induce members to toe the current party line.1 With strict
party discipline, party leaders can eliminate the scope for independent expression of opinions
1See, for example, McGillivray (1997), Snyder and Groseclose (2000) and McCarty et al. (2001).
1and interests by their fellow party members in the course of policy making. Here we identify
strict discipline with a party￿ s ability to induce ex post adherence to a pre-announced position.
Parties have an ex ante incentive to make campaign announcements in order to further their
electoral objectives, but the e⁄ectiveness of these announcements will re￿ ect their ability to
ensure compliance. Thus, the parties will want to use what tools they have at their disposal
to induce the elected politicians to honor the party￿ s promises. We might have referred to
our institutional variable as ￿the extent of commitment to party platforms,￿but we felt that
this alternative terminology would be too cumbersome.
In this and a companion paper (Grossman and Helpman, 2004) we develop a new model
of majoritarian elections and legislative policymaking that we hope will hold independent
interest and prove useful for examining a variety of political-economic issues. In our model,
winner-take-all elections occur in single-member legislative districts. The two political parties
move ￿rst by announcing their policy platforms, with the aim of maximizing their chances of
taking control of the legislature. Next, the heterogeneous voters in each district vote for the
local candidate of one or the other party, with the goal of maximizing their personal expected
welfare in the face of uncertainty about the relative popularity of the two parties in districts
other than their own. Finally, the elected members of the legislature set policy to further the
interests of their constituents, but in recognition of the political penalties that their national
party will impose if they fail to deliver on the party￿ s campaign promises. We introduce a
parameter that measures the cost to the legislators of deviating from the party platform and
so captures the ￿extent of commitment to party platforms￿or what we call party discipline.
At one extreme value of this parameter, the legislators are fully committed; at the other,
they behave like citizen candidates.
We use the model to examine pork-barrel spending; i.e., projects that are ￿nanced by
broad-based taxation but provide bene￿ts that are geographically limited in scope.2 We
consider a polity with three districts that are symmetric ex ante. There are three public
goods, each of which provides bene￿ts to residents in one of the districts. Bene￿t functions
are identical, as are the costs of the public goods and the distributions of political preference
among voters in the districts. Ex post, spending on the three public goods depends on the
outcomes of the three regional elections. If, for example, the same political party wins the
election in all three districts, then spending in every district will be the same. The spending
levels typically will diverge from the e¢ cient levels, however, because the parties will have
made earlier promises that will a⁄ect the legislators￿ex post choices. Depending on the
degree of party discipline, the ex post spending in each district when the same party wins
the election in all three can exceed or fall short of the e¢ cient level.
When one party wins in two districts but loses in the third, the legislature will concentrate
2In Grossman and Helpman (2004) we use a similar model to study the determination of trade protection
when industries are geographically concentrated.
2pork in the districts represented in the majority delegation, to the relative neglect of the
district whose representative is a member of the minority party. Thus, there will be ex post
inequality in spite of the ex ante symmetry￿ a kind of tyranny of the majority. Spending
in a minority district need not be zero, because the elected representatives may be partially
bound by prior promises; but it will always be ine¢ ciently small. Spending in the two
majority districts may be socially excessive or de￿cient, again depending on the extent of
party discipline.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that both the rhetoric and reality of pork-
barrel spending bears a non-monotonic relationship to the parameter that represents the
ability of parties to commit to a campaign platform. The promised level of per district
spending is very high when party discipline is low, but falls as discipline rises as long as the
anticipated spending in a minority district remains at zero. Once the parameter representing
discipline reaches a critical level, however, the majority delegation of legislators will feel
compelled to deliver positive pork even to a district they do not represent. Thereafter,
further increases in discipline result in rising campaign promises and increased spending levels.
Actual spending in a district that is represented in a two-member majority delegation also
falls and then rises as a function of the parameter measuring the extent of pre-commitment
possibilities. Our analysis suggests, therefore, that the cross-sectional e⁄ects of political
institutions cannot always be captured by simple correlations.
It is noteworthy too that the aggregate e¢ ciency of ￿scal policy bears a non-monotonic
relationship to the degree of party discipline. When discipline is lax, the parties make ex-
travagant promises and actual spending in districts represented in a majority delegation is
socially excessive. In fact, the lavish spending in these districts may leave a typical voter￿ s
expected welfare below what it would be were national spending on local public goods to be
constitutionally prohibited. As discipline rises from these very low levels, the strong nega-
tive response of spending in districts represented in a two-member majority is su¢ cient to
raise expected welfare. At the opposite extreme, when discipline is quite strict, spending in
every district falls below the e¢ cient level, which means that the extra spending that results
from an increase in discipline again enhances expected welfare. But, for intermediate levels
of discipline, each party promises pork at the highest level consistent with ex post spend-
ing of zero in a district represented by a member of the minority party. Then spending in
districts represented in the majority falls monotonically with discipline from levels that are
socially excessive to levels that are socially de￿cient. Expected welfare rises then falls as
party discipline varies in this range.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the three stages￿
campaign, election, and policy￿ of our political game. We seek a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the electoral game between political parties, so we describe the legislative deliberations ￿rst,
the equilibrium voting behavior second, and the platform choices last. In Section 3, we derive
3the equilibrium platforms and spending levels as a function of the parameter representing
the extent of party discipline. We refer to these respectively as the rhetoric and reality of
pork-barrel policy. Then, in Section 4, we study how the announcements and policies vary
with the political environment. We also examine the relationship between ex ante expected
welfare and the degree of party discipline. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Pork-Barrel Spending
We study how party discipline a⁄ects pork-barrel spending in a majoritarian political system.
Our model of public spending is a simple and familiar one￿ a central government can provide
public goods that bene￿t citizens in speci￿c geographic areas with funds raised by lump-sum
levies on a national tax base.3 In the political game, the national parties move ￿rst by
announcing positions on the pork-barrel projects, with the goal of maximizing their chances
of winning a majority in the national legislature. Then, the ideologically diverse voters elect
representatives to the legislature. Finally, the members of the majority delegation in the
legislature adopt a spending program to serve their constituents conditioned by the disciplines
imposed by their national party. The legislators need not enact the projects endorsed by their
party; thus, the political rhetoric may di⁄er from the political reality.
Consider a polity with three geographic districts and two political parties. Citizens derive
utility from consumption of private goods, consumption of a local public good, and from
other policies enacted by the party in power. A resident i of district j has the quasi-linear
preferences
uij = cij + H(gj) + ￿K
ij + ￿K
j ,
where cij denotes the individual￿ s consumption of private goods, gj is the size of a public
project that yields bene￿ts (only) to residents of district j, and ￿K
ij + ￿K
j represents utility
that the individual derives from other policies that will come into e⁄ect if party K captures
a majority in the legislature. The function H(￿) is increasing and concave.
Let the populations of the three districts be equal and normalize each to one. Funds
raised by the tax system (in units of the private good) can be converted one-for-one into
units of any of the three local public goods. Since the government levies lump-sum taxes, a
program g = (g1;g2;g3) requires a per capita levy of 1
3
P3
j=1 gj. Thus, resident i of district
j, who has (exogenous) income Iij, would consume cK




j units of private




We distinguish the political objectives of the national parties from those of the individual
politicians who are elected to o¢ ce. The national party has an ideological agenda, which is
3This is the same model of local public goods that was used extensively in Persson and Tabellini (2000) to
address a variety of political-economic quesitons.
4re￿ ected in the ￿other￿policies it will enact (besides the pork barrel spending) if elected. In
order to pursue this agenda, the party must capture a majority of seats in the legislature. We
assume, therefore, that a party￿ s objective is to do just that; i.e., to maximize the probability
that it will win at least two of the district elections. The legislators, on the other hand, are
beholden to their constituents. We do not model a sequence of elections and so cannot derive
the politicians￿objective functions endogenously. Instead, we assume that elected legislators
pursue the interests of district residents, but bear a political cost for any departures from
party discipline. The legislators￿objective functions are described in greater detail below.
We seek a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a three-stage game in which the parties A and
B announce the spending programs gA and gB, respectively, in the ￿rst stage, the voters
in each district elect a single representative to the national legislature in the second stage,
and the elected representatives supply the public goods gK
L in the third stage, where K
indicates the party that controls the legislature and L indicates the set of districts in which
the candidates from party K garner a majority of votes.
2.1 The Policy Stage
Let us begin with the ￿nal, policy stage. At this stage, the majority delegation from party
K comprises the representatives of two or three districts. Party K has previously announced
a position gK on the set of pork-barrel projects. The party sought competitive advantage by
announcing its position and it hopes to be able to use similar tactics in subsequent elections.
Accordingly, it imposes such penalties as it can on elected party members when they deviate
from the party￿ s announced position. How much the party can penalize its members for
pursuing their parochial objectives depends upon the institutional setting. If, for example,
regional campaigns are ￿nanced by the national party, or if the party controls other resources
such as committee assignments and patronage positions, then the party will have ample
￿sticks and carrots￿with which to induce compliant behavior. We do not explicitly model
the instruments of party discipline, but rather attempt to capture them in reduced form
with a parameter ￿. If the legislators from majority party K enact a pork-barrel program








￿2. If, for example, ￿ = 0, then discipline is lacking, and the legislators are
free to serve their local constituents with complete impunity. As ￿ ! 1, a party has the
wherewithal to keep its individual politicians fully in line. Then the party can commit to
actions that its candidates surely will take if they are elected.
We assume that each legislator has as his objective to maximize the aggregate welfare of
the residents of his district net of costs he will bear for failing to deliver on his party￿ s promises.
We also assume that members of a given political party have the ability to transfer (political)
utility among themselves, for example by sharing patronage bene￿ts. In contrast, members of
5di⁄erent political parties lack the means to e⁄ect such transfers.4 Then a majority delegation
of party K comprising representatives from the set of districts L will choose a spending
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where Ij is aggregate income in district j. The interests of those residing in districts repre-
sented by legislators in the minority party are neglected in the process of distributing pork.
We can now link the policy outcomes to the composition of the legislature and the an-














L;j denotes spending on the public project in district j when party K holds a majority































2.2 The Election Stage
Citizens enter the voting booth knowing the announced positions of each party. They
anticipate the links between possible election outcomes and policy choices, as described in
(1), (2), and (3). However, they are imperfectly informed about the average voter preferences
in districts other than their own. Each individual votes for the candidate who, if elected in
her district, would o⁄er her the highest level of expected utility. This is a weakly dominant
strategy for the voter.
Voters di⁄er in their tastes for the parties￿ideological positions, as noted above. The
taste disparities have idiosyncratic and regional components. We de￿ne ￿ij = ￿B
ij ￿￿A
ij as the
idiosyncratic component of the relative preference of voter i in district j for the ideological
positions and other characteristics of party B compared to party A. Similarly, ￿j = ￿B
j ￿￿A
j
represents the relative preference for the positions of party B (positive or negative) shared
by all residents of district j. We assume that ￿ij has mean zero in every district j and that it
is distributed uniformly on values ranging from ￿1=2h to 1=2h. The parameter h measures
4Of course, this is just an extreme case of a less controversial claim, that members of a political party have
better means to transfer utility among themselves than do members of opposing parties.
6(inversely) the extent of preference diversity among citizens in any district. The residents of
a district know their own preferences, of course, by the time they enter the voting booth, but
they are not sure of the mean preferences of those residing in other districts. Each voter in
district j views ￿k and ￿‘ as independent random variables drawn from a common, cumulative
distribution function F(￿). To preserve the symmetry of the two parties in the eyes of the
(average) voter, we take the density function associated with F (￿) to be single-peaked and
symmetric about ￿ = 0.
Consider the problem facing voter i in district 1. If the candidate for party A wins in
district 1, her utility will depend on the election results in districts 2 and 3 and on the positions
previously announced by the two parties (since these will a⁄ect the subsequent legislative








=3 be the common component of
utility for any individual in district j that arises from the spending program gK. Using this
notation, the expected utility for voter i conditional on a victory by party A in district 1 can
be written as
UA













































where ￿j is the probability that party A will win in district j as perceived by a voter outside
that district. Here, the term in the ￿rst square brackets is the utility that voter i in district 1
would derive from all of the policy actions (pork barrel and ￿other￿ ) that would be enacted by
party A were it to win in all three districts. This is multiplied by the probability that party
A will win in both districts 2 and 3, since we are conditioning on the event of a victory by
party A in district 1. The other terms in the expression for UA
i1 can be understood similarly.
Note especially the last term, which represents the probability of a victory by party B in
districts 2 and 3 multiplied by the voter￿ s evaluation of the policies that would be enacted
by party B (not party A) in this eventuality.
Similarly, we can evaluate the expected utility for voter i in district 1 conditional on an
electoral victory by the candidate from party B in this district, which is
UB













































Voter i casts her ballot for the candidate from party A if and only if UA
i1 ￿ UB
























































￿1 = ￿2(1 ￿ ￿3) + ￿3(1 ￿ ￿2) .
Inequality (4) gives the upper bound on a voter￿ s idiosyncratic relative preference for the
ideological positions of party B such that she nonetheless votes for the candidate from party
A. This bound depends on the relative preference of voters in district 1 for the announced
spending program of party A, the district-wide average preference among voters in district
1 for the ideological positions of party B, and the probability ￿1 that district 1 will prove to
be pivotal in determining which party controls a majority in the legislature.
Considering that ￿i1 is distributed uniformly on [￿1=2h;1=2h], the fraction of votes that
party A will capture in district 1 (as a function of ￿1 and the announced platforms) is given
by s1 = 1=2+h￿1=￿1 ￿h￿1. The probability that party A will capture the seat in district 1
(as viewed from outside the district) is the probability that s1 ￿ 1=2, or the probability that
￿1 ￿ ￿1=￿1. Thus, ￿1 = F (￿1=￿1). More generally, we can write
￿j = F(￿j=￿j) (5)
where ￿j and ￿j are de￿ned analogously to ￿1 and ￿1, respectively, with j in place of 1, k
in place of 2, and ‘ in place of 3, j 6= k, j 6= ‘, and k 6= ‘.
2.3 Campaign Stage
We turn to the initial stage of the political game, when the parties announce their positions
on the pork-barrel projects. At this stage, the party leaders are uncertain about the relative
popularity of the two parties among voters in the three districts. The leaders regard each
￿j as randomly and independently distributed with distribution F(￿). Thus, each party sees
a link between the pair of announcements gA and gB and the probability of a victory by
party A in district j such as is given in equation (5). Party A chooses its positions on the
pork-barrel projects to maximize the probability that it will win in at least two districts,
which is
￿ = ￿1￿2￿3 + ￿1￿2(1 ￿ ￿3) + ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿3 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿2￿3 .
Party B seeks to minimize ￿.
Consider the choice of gA
1 , which is the proposal by party A for spending on projects in











= 0 . (6)
Party B has an analogous ￿rst-order condition for minimizing ￿.
Since the parties have the same average popularity among voters and similar incentives
in regard to pork-barrel spending, it is natural to focus on a symmetric equilibrium. In a
symmetric equilibrium, the parties announce identical positions, i.e., gA = gB = g: Then,
the economic platforms of the two parties have equal appeal to voters, and thus ￿j = 0 for
all j. In the event, each party has a ￿fty percent chance of winning in each district; i.e.,







= 0 . (7)
We shall also describe an equilibrium in which the parties treat the three districts similarly.
It may seem natural that they should do so, inasmuch as the three districts have equal
populations of voters, similar distributions of ideological preferences, and similar tastes for
the local public goods. However, Myerson (1993) has shown in a di⁄erent but related context
that candidates might prefer to target ￿goodies￿to a subset of otherwise similar voters. In his
model, there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium in which voters are treated symmetrically.
Our setting di⁄ers from his, because voters have preferences for one party or the other
apart from their evaluation of the goodies they are promised in the course of the electoral
competition. We ￿nd that the parties have strong incentives to concentrate their promises
of public spending in only two districts when F0(0) is large (the density of the regional
popularity shock is high at zero), but that they prefer to treat the districts similarly when
F0(0) is small.6 In what follows, we focus on the latter case.
Let g denote the level of pork-barrel spending promised by both parties to every district
in a symmetric equilibrium. Note that g is just rhetoric, while the reality of public spending
varies with the composition of the elected legislature. The spending on a particular project
will depend on whether the elected representative from the district is a member of the majority
party or not, and if so, whether the majority delegation comprises two or three legislators.
5More formally, a maximum requires @￿=@g
A
1 ￿ 0 for a small downward deviation in g
A
1 from the equilibrium
value and @￿=@g
A
1 ￿ 0 for a small upward deviation in g
A
1 from the equilibrium value. This detail will become
important for certain parameter values, as @￿=@g
A
1 is not everywhere continuous.
6More speci￿cally, we have used numerical methods to evaluate the best response by party A when party B
chooses a spending program that satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition in (7). We ￿nd in numerous such examples
that the second-order conditions for maximizing ￿ are violated when F
0(0) is large, but that they are satisfed
when F
0(0) is su¢ ciently small. In these latter cases, the platform that satis￿es (7) is a (global) best response
for party A.
9In the symmetric environment we describe, the spending is the same in each of the two
districts included in a two-member majority no matter which two districts happen to be in
the majority, and the spending in a district represented by a minority legislator is the same
no matter which district that is. We denote by ￿ g3 the actual spending in each district when
the majority delegation comprises three legislators, by ￿ g2 the actual spending in a district
included in a two-member majority delegation, and by ￿ g0 the spending in a district excluded
from the majority delegation.
We can now use the de￿nitions of ￿j and Vj to rewrite the ￿rst-order condition (7) for































= 0 . (8)
The three terms in the expression on the left-hand side give the marginal e⁄ect of a change in
gA
1 on the electoral prospects of party A via the induced changes in spending in district 1 in
the event that this district is included in a three-member majority, included in a two-member
majority, and excluded from the majority, respectively. The impact on the party￿ s prospects
come not only from the marginal e⁄ect on voters in district 1 who are a⁄ected by these
changes, but also from the marginal e⁄ect on voters in districts 2 and 3, who must share in
the cost of providing public goods to district 1. Finally, note that the solution to (8) gives
not only the optimal choice of gA
1 , but also the Nash equilibrium value of g, since the parties
behave similarly in the symmetric equilibrium and they treat all districts the same.
3 Equilibrium Platforms and Policies
To simplify the exposition, we adopt a quadratic form for the (per capita and aggregate)
bene￿ts from the local public goods. We assume that H(g) = ￿g ￿ ￿g2=2 for g ￿ ￿=￿ and
H(g) = ￿2=2￿ for g ￿ ￿=￿. Concavity requires ￿ > 0. We also take ￿ > 1, so that a social
planner would provide a positive amount (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ of each public good.
Suppose that some party has announced the platform g = (g;g;g) and now it wins the













The chosen spending level equates the marginal bene￿t from spending, ￿￿￿￿ g3 (if ￿ g3 < ￿=￿)
to the marginal cost, 1 + ￿(￿ g3 ￿ g), where the latter includes not only the unit cost of the
goods, but also the (marginal) political cost to the legislators of deviating from the promised
10spending level, g.
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in each of the two districts represented by a member of the majority delegation and
￿ g0(g) =
(
0 for g ￿ 2
3￿
g ￿ 2
3￿ for g ￿ 2
3￿
(11)
in the remaining district. Notice that ￿ g2 > ￿ g3 for all ￿nite ￿ and all g. The perceived bene￿ts
from spending in a district are the same no matter how many districts are represented in the
majority delegation, but the perceived costs of the spending are smaller when the taxes borne
by residents of one district are neglected in the policy-making calculus; the unit cost of 1 that
appears in the formula for ￿ g3 is replaced by 2=3 in the formula for ￿ g2. Also, ￿ g0 = 0 unless
g is su¢ ciently large; i.e., unless g > 2=3￿. The majority delegation perceives no political
bene￿t from delivering pork to a district represented by a member of the minority party. It
will undertake spending in such a district only if the party had promised some reasonably
high level of public goods and if the political cost of neglecting that promise is su¢ ciently
great. Finally, note that all spending levels are strictly increasing in the announcement, g,
except when g is small so that ￿ g0 = 0.
Equations (9), (10) and (11) relate the various possible policy outcomes to the policy
announcement. We can now use these equations to ￿nd the announcement that satis￿es the
￿rst-order condition, (8). In so doing, we recognize that symmetry implies gA
f1;2;3g;1 = ￿ g3(g),
gA
f1;2;g;1 = ￿ g2, gA
f2;3g;1 = ￿ g0; and gA
1 = g. We note that H0(￿ g) = ￿ ￿ ￿￿ g if ￿ g < ￿=￿ and that
H0(￿ g) = 0 otherwise. Also, @￿ g3=@g = ￿=(￿+￿) for g < 1=￿+￿=￿ and @￿ g2=@g = ￿=(￿+￿) for
g < 2=3￿ + ￿=￿. For g > 2=3￿ + ￿=￿, @￿ g2=@g = 1 and for g > 1=￿ + ￿=￿, @￿ g3=@g = 1. The
change in responsiveness of local spending in a district to changes in the campaign promise
is due to the assumed satiation of voters when the quantity of their local public good reaches
￿=￿. Finally, note that @￿ g0=@g = 0 for g < 2=3￿, while @￿ g0=@g = 1 for g > 2=3￿. This
fact, which will prove to be important for understanding our ￿ndings below, re￿ ects that a
district not represented in the majority delegation receives no pork whatsoever for low levels
of the announcement, but spending there rises one-for-one with the announcement once g is
so high that the legislators provide pork even to this district to mitigate the costs of reneging
on their party￿ s promise.
Let ￿(g) denote the left-hand side of (8); i.e. (a positive multiple of) the marginal
electoral bene￿t to a party from increasing the size of its campaign promise to a typical
district. There are four segments of ￿(g) according to whether the supply of public goods to
11a minority district responds to a change in the campaign promise or not, and whether the
response of the supply to represented districts re￿ ects a positive marginal value of the good
in the district or just the positive marginal cost of deviating from the party￿ s promise. For
g < 2=3￿, ￿ g0 does not respond to g. For 2=3￿ < g < 2=3￿ + ￿=￿, ￿ g0 responds, but only as
a re￿ ection of party discipline. For 2=3￿ + ￿=￿ < g < 1=￿ + ￿=￿, ￿ g0 and ￿ g2 respond only
for disciplinary reasons, and for g > 1=￿ + ￿=￿, ￿ g0, ￿ g2, and ￿ g3 all respond only because the
legislators wish to mitigate the rising discipline costs. Substituting the relevant expressions
into (8), we ￿nd
￿(g) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
￿
3(￿+￿)2 [2￿ + 9￿(￿ ￿ ￿g) ￿ 5￿] for g < 2
3￿
￿
3(￿+￿)2 [2￿ + 9￿(￿ ￿ ￿g) ￿ 5￿] ￿
￿
2￿








(￿+￿)2(￿ ￿ ￿g ￿ 1) ￿ 1 for 2
3￿ + ￿
￿ < g < 1
￿ + ￿
￿




Figure 1 depicts ￿(g) for a polity with little party discipline; i.e., ￿ < 4￿=(9￿ ￿ 5). Note
that ￿(0) > 0 and that ￿(g) declines linearly with g for g < 2=3￿ and for 2=3￿ + ￿=￿ <
g < 1=￿ + ￿=￿. For ￿ < 4￿=(9￿ ￿ 5), ￿(g) rises linearly with g for 2=3￿ < g < 2=3￿ + ￿=￿.
Finally, for g > 1=￿ + ￿=￿, ￿(g) is ￿ at and equal to ￿2. It is easy to show that the curve
jumps downward at g = 2=3￿, again at 2=3￿+￿=￿, and again at g = 1=￿+￿=￿. For this case
of low discipline, ￿(g) < 0 for g slightly below 2=3￿ and ￿(g) < 0 for all g > 2=3￿. Therefore,











Next suppose that party discipline is ￿moderate￿ ; i.e. that 4￿=(9￿￿5) < ￿ ￿ ￿(3+3￿+
p
3 + 6￿ + 27￿2)=(6￿ ￿ 6). In this case, ￿(g) takes the form shown in Figure 2. This ￿gure
is qualitatively similar to Figure 1, except that ￿(g) is positive for g slightly to the left of
2=3￿ while g is negative for g slightly to the right of 2=3￿, for ￿ in this range. It follows that
each party has an electoral incentive to increase its promises of local public spending for all
g < 2=3￿, but an incentive to decrease its promises of local public spending for all g > 2=3￿.
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Finally, suppose that party discipline is strict; i.e., ￿ > ￿(3+3￿+
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Figure 3: Equilibrium announcement when party discipline is high
6). In this case, ￿(g) appears as in Figure 3. For such high values of ￿, ￿(g) is downward
sloping in every region except when g > 1=￿ + ￿=￿, where it is ￿ at. We ￿nd that ￿(g) > 0
for all g < 2=3￿ and ￿(g) < 0 for all g > 2=3￿ + ￿=￿. The unique equilibrium falls between
these values, where
g =
6￿3(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 2￿2￿(1 + 3￿) ￿ ￿￿2(5 + 3￿) ￿ 2￿3
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We can substitute the equilibrium values of g into (9), (10), and (11) to solve for the equi-
librium spending in a district whose elected representative is a member of a three-member
majority delegation, a two-member majority, and a minority delegation, respectively. We
study the relationship between party discipline and pork-barrel spending in the section that
follows.
4 Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Spending
4.1 Policy Rhetoric
We use (12), (13) and (14) to plot the relationship between the level of spending on local public
goods that each party announces in a Nash equilibrium and the parameter that measures the
strength of party discipline. We do so in Figure 4 for the case of ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1. As we shall
now explain, the qualitative features of the ￿gure￿ including the apparent non-monotonicity
in the relationship between the size of the announcement and ￿￿ hold for all values of ￿ > 1
and ￿ > 0.








Figure 4: Equilibrium platform as a function of party discipline for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
When party discipline is lax, the political rhetoric is shrill. Each party promises extrav-
agant spending on local public goods, with g ! 1 as ￿ ! 0. But voters recognize that
the promises will not be fully honored. Indeed, the modest penalties for deviating from the
platform will allow elected legislators to turn their backs entirely on a district that is not
included in the majority (￿ g0 = 0). Nonetheless, anticipated pork-barrel spending in a district
that does end up represented in a majority￿ be it a two-district majority or a three-district
majority￿ is quite lavish. We shall ￿nd in the next section that, for ￿ small, ￿ g3 exceeds the
e¢ cient level of spending and ￿ g2 exceeds the level of spending that maximizes the well-being
of residents of the two districts that comprise a two-member majority. In other words, the
promises induce the legislators to opt for greater pork-barrel spending than even their own
constituents would like. Why would the parties make such extravagant promises? The an-
swer is that each party chooses gj not only to make the anticipated spending attractive to
residents of district j, but also to make it unattractive for voters in other districts to elect
the candidate of the opposing party. An increase in party A￿ s promised spending in district
1, for example, raises the expected tax bill and thus lowers welfare for voters in district 2 in
the event that the candidates from party A win in districts 1 and 3 but not their own.
In the region of lax discipline, (12) implies that promised spending in each district is
a decreasing function of ￿. In such circumstances, the parties and voters recognize that
a district whose representative is not included in a majority delegation will be allocated
no pork-barrel spending. Thus, a change in ￿ has no e⁄ect on ￿ g0 in this range. Since
15@￿ g3=@g = @￿ g2=@g = ￿=(￿ + ￿) > 0 for g < 2=3￿, the ￿rst-order condition (8) is satis￿ed if
and only if H0(￿ g3) ￿ 1 + 2[H0(￿ g2) ￿ 1=3] = 0. But an increase in ￿ causes both ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 to
rise at constant g. This reduces both H0(￿ g3) and H0(￿ g2), and so it shifts downward the ￿rst
segment of ￿(g) in Figure 1. The result is a lower equilibrium value of g.
To understand why the parties temper their promises as discipline increases (for low
￿), we note that g > ￿ g2 > ￿ g3 when ￿ is small. Then, if a party were to hold its promise
constant, a tightening of discipline would raise anticipated spending in any majority district
for all possible election outcomes. But public goods have diminishing marginal value to
voters and constant marginal cost. So, the increase in anticipated spending would reduce the
attractiveness of the party￿ s platform in all districts. The party avoids this by moderating
its promise.
As ￿ rises and g falls, the maximum announcement consistent with zero spending in
a district not represented in the majority delegation (call it ^ g) falls even faster than g.
Eventually, a ￿ is reached such that, if a party were to promise a spending level g = 2=9￿ +
(9￿ ￿ 5)=9 as it does for low values of ￿, ￿ g0 would turn positive. But once ￿ g0 is positive
and responds to g, an additional term enters into the marginal electoral e⁄ect of a change
in the announcement. Thus, we reach the region of ￿moderate￿￿, where a cut in a party￿ s
campaign promise induces an anticipated change in spending only in districts included in a
majority, but an increase in the promise induces an anticipated change in spending in all
three districts. This is the region in which Figure 2 applies.
In the region of moderate discipline, the marginal electoral bene￿t of an increase in g
is strictly positive for g < ^ g and strictly negative for g > ^ g (see Figure 2). Accordingly,
each party chooses the largest policy announcement that yields zero spending in a district
represented by a member of the minority party. As discipline strengthens in this range, the
pressure on an elected legislature to provide positive public goods to a district that is not
represented in the majority intensi￿es as well. The parties must promise ever less to ensure
that spending will be zero in an excluded district. In other words, g = ^ g = 2=3￿ falls with
￿ in this region. Thus, the equilibrium campaign promises continue to moderate as party
discipline strengthens.
So too do the anticipated levels of spending in majority districts, as we shall see in the
next section. Indeed, ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 fall to levels that are below the e¢ cient levels of spending.
Why would a party announce a platform that leads to so little anticipated spending, when
it knows that voters in every district would prefer more? Again, the answer has to do with
party￿ s desire not only to reward districts that elect its candidates but also to punish those
that fail to give their support. An increase in, say, party A￿ s promise of spending in district
1 would increase the welfare of voters in that district for those election outcomes in which
party A wins both in district 1 and in at least one other district. But the higher promise
would also bene￿t voters in district 1 if party A were to capture a majority in the legislature
16while losing in district 1. This latter e⁄ect reduces the cost to residents of district 1 of voting
against party A, and the party takes this into account when formulating its platform.
Finally, we reach a ￿ large enough such that ￿ > 0 for g slightly above ^ g. This is the region
of high discipline￿ illustrated in Figure 3￿ in which the parties ￿nd it optimal to announce
a platform that yields positive spending even in a district represented by a legislator in the
minority party. In this region, there are con￿ icting forces at work on the parties￿choices of





























When ￿ is large, @￿ g3=@g = @￿ g2=@g = ￿=(￿ + ￿) and @￿ g0=@g = 1. Thus, an increase in ￿
raises the responsiveness of spending in a majority district￿ be it one that is part of a three-
district majority or one that is part of a two-district majority￿ to changes in the campaign
announcement. Since, as we shall see, H0(￿ g3) > H0(￿ g2) > 1 in this range, this tends to raise
￿(g), the marginal electoral value of the announcement. The actual spending levels, ￿ g3, ￿ g2,
and ￿ g0, all move in the direction of the announcement, g, as ￿ rises for given g. But since ￿ g3
and ￿ g2 may exceed or fall short of the campaign promise for high ￿, these changes in spending
may contribute to an increase or a decrease in ￿. The increase in ￿ unambiguously pulls ￿ g0
toward the higher promised level of spending, thereby reducing the marginal valuation H0(￿ g0),
and thus contributing to a higher value of ￿ via an increase in the last term. Despite the
con￿ icting forces on the marginal electoral value of the announcement level, we are able to
prove that an increase in ￿ shifts ￿(g) upward at constant g throughout the region of high
party discipline.7 Thus, promised pork rises with a strengthening of party discipline once
party discipline is already su¢ ciently strict. Likely, the unambiguously positive relationship
between g and ￿ in this range re￿ ects our choice of a quadratic form for the bene￿t function,
H.
To summarize, we ￿nd that the campaign promise of pork-barrel spending in each district
bears a non-monotonic relationship to the severity of party discipline. When discipline
is lax, the parties anticipate that the elected legislature will provide public goods only to
districts represented in the majority. Then, the level of promised spending declines with a
strengthening of party discipline. But, at some critical level of ￿; the party recognizes that the
promise far exceeds the zero spending that will actually occur in a minority district. With
7We have proved directly that dg=d￿ > 0 for high party discipline, using the formula for g in equation (14).
The derivative of the expression on the right-hand-side of (14) with respect to ￿ equals zero at exactly four
points, only one of which is positive, namely, ￿ = ￿=2. Moreover, this expression attains a local minimum at
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for ￿ > 1. Therefore g is an increasing function of ￿ when party discipline is high.
17yet further increases in party discipline, a majority delegation comprising two legislators will
￿nd it too politically costly to withhold all pork-barrel spending from the minority district.
Anticipating this, the parties respond to further increases in party discipline by elevating
their promises. As ￿ ! 1, the parties are able virtually to pre-commit their candidates to
a level of pork-barrel spending in each district, regardless of the composition of the elected
legislature. Then g ! (￿￿1)=￿, the spending level that would be chosen by a social planner.
This is in keeping with the ￿ndings of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), who show that parties
commit to e¢ cient policies when their campaign promises are fully credible.
4.2 Policy Reality
Now we can examine the relationship between party discipline and the pork-barrel spending
that results for the di⁄erent possible election outcomes. For this, we use equations (9), (10),
and (11), together with the expressions for the equilibrium value of g.
Consider ￿rst the spending in any district when all three seats in the legislature are
captured by the same party. Since the equilibrium announcement g never exceeds 2=3￿+￿=￿,
(9) implies that per-district spending ￿ g3 never reaches the satiation level. Substituting the
equilibrium value of g into (9), we ￿nd
￿ g3 =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
9￿￿5
9￿ ￿ 2

















Figure 5 shows the relationship between per-district spending and party discipline for the
case ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1.
As the ￿gure illustrates, spending in a district that is part of a three-district majority
exceeds the e¢ cient level of (￿￿1)=￿ when ￿ ! 0 and it grows with ￿ when party discipline
is low. In this range of low ￿, a strengthening of discipline causes the parties to moderate
their promises (g falls), but the legislators have greater incentive to deliver on what has been
promised. When all three legislators are members of the same party, the latter e⁄ect must
dominate. To see this, recall that the the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal platform re-
quires H0(￿ g3)￿1+2[H0(￿ g2) ￿ 1=3] = 0, because the parties set their platforms in anticipation
that the legislature will allocate no pork to a district that ends up outside the ruling coalition.
For this condition to be satis￿ed following an increase in ￿, exactly one of ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 must rise
and the other must fall. But it is easy to see that d￿ g3=d￿ > d￿ g2=d￿ when ￿ is small, which












Figure 5: Equilibrium ￿ g3 as a function of party discipline for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
means that d￿ g3=d￿ > 0.8
When party discipline is in an intermediate range in which the promised level of spending
per district is the largest amount consistent with zero ex post spending in a minority district,
￿ g3 falls with increases in ￿. Again, the tightening of discipline causes each party to moderate
its promises, but now the decline in g must result in decreased delivery to majority districts
as well. However, when discipline is su¢ ciently strong that spending in a minority district
would be positive, the per-district spending in case of a three-district majority rises with
further increases in ￿. In this case, the campaign promise rises with ￿ as we have seen and
even if the legislators are delivering more than what is promised, the net e⁄ect of an increase
in ￿ will be for ￿ g3 to rise.9
Using (10), we can derive similarly the relationship between party discipline and public
spending in either of the two districts that happen to be included in a two-district majority.
When a party wins the local elections in exactly two districts, the legislator allocates pork of
￿ g2 to each of those districts, where
8From (9) and (10), (d￿ g3=d￿) ￿ (d￿ g2=d￿) = 1=3(￿ + ￿)
2 > 0.
9When ￿ > ￿
￿
3 + 3￿ +
p
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Figure 6: Equilibrium ￿ g2 as a function of party discipline for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
￿ g2 =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
9￿￿5
9￿ + 1

















Figure 6 depicts the relationship between ￿ g2 and ￿ for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1; the qualitative
features of the ￿gure apply more generally. Speci￿cally, we see that spending in a majority
district falls with ￿ when party discipline is low or moderate, but rises with ￿ once discipline
is strong enough that spending in a minority district turns positive.10 For ￿ near zero, ￿ g2
exceeds (￿ ￿ 2=3)=￿, the level of spending that maximizes welfare for the residents of the
two districts represented in the majority delegation. Yet when ￿ is in the upper end of the
moderate range, ￿ g2 falls short of even the socially e¢ cient level of spending, (￿ ￿ 1)=￿:
Finally, we can use (11) to examine pork-barrel spending in a district whose representative
10When ￿ > ￿
￿
3 + 3￿ +
p
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2 > 0.
20is not a member of the majority party. Using (14), we ￿nd
￿ g0 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :











As we have seen, the legislature does not provide any public goods to a minority district when
party discipline is low or moderate. But, when ￿ grows su¢ ciently large, the legislators will
provide pork even to the district that they do not represent in order to moderate the discipline
costs. In this range, the allocation of pork to the minority district grows monotonically with
the degree of party discipline.11
What happens to spending as discipline becomes nearly perfect? We have seen that as
￿ ! 1, g ! (￿ ￿ 1)=￿, the per-district spending level that would be chosen by a social
planner. Moreover, it becomes prohibitively costly for the elected legislature to deviate from
what their party has announced. Accordingly, spending in every district approaches the
e¢ cient level of (￿ ￿ 1)=￿, irrespective of the election outcome and whether a district￿ s
representative is included in the majority or not. The reader can verify that our expressions
for ￿ g3, ￿ g2 and ￿ g0 all converge to (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ as ￿ approaches in￿nity.
4.3 Expected Welfare
We can use our analysis of the equilibrium policy choices for the di⁄erent possible election out-
comes to examine the relationship between party discipline and the e¢ ciency of government
spending on local public goods. From an ex ante perspective, each voter has a one-quarter
probability that his district will be represented in the legislative delegation of a three-member
majority, a one-half probability that his district will be represented in a two-member ma-
jority, and a one-quarter probability that his district￿ s elected representative will not be a
member of the majority delegation. Thus, the expected welfare from public spending for the
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11When ￿ > ￿
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Figure 7: Expected welfare as a function of party discipline for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
Figure 7 plots expected welfare as a function of ￿ for ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1. As the ￿gure shows,
welfare is quite low when the parties have little ability to commit the spending behavior of
the legislators. More generally, as ￿ ! 0, EV !
￿
9￿2 ￿ 18￿ + 7
￿
=24￿, which is positive if
and only if ￿ > 1 +
p
2=3. In other words, if ￿ is small, a polity with little party discipline
delivers lower expected welfare than one that is unable to provide any local public goods
whatsoever. The low level of expected welfare results from over-spending in districts that are
represented in majority delegations and under-spending in districts that are not represented
in the majority.
In the region of low discipline, expected welfare rises monotonically with an increase in
party discipline. In this region, ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 both exceed the e¢ cient level, and the former
rises with ￿ while the latter falls. But the net e⁄ect is always positive.12 As ￿ rises into
the region of moderate discipline, where the parties￿announcements are such as to just keep
the level of spending in a minority district just equal to zero, expected welfare continues
to rise.13 Here, both ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 remain above the e¢ cient level of spending, and both fall
when discipline strengthens. But ￿ g3 will eventually fall below the e¢ cient level of spending
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22when ￿ passes 2￿=[3(￿ ￿ 1)] and even the spending in a district represented in a two-member
majority delegation will fall below the e¢ cient level when ￿ exceeds 2￿=[3(￿ ￿ 1)]. Both of
these values of ￿ fall within the region of moderate discipline, and both ￿ g3 and ￿ g2 are declining
throughout the region. Thus, there must come a critical level of ￿ between 2￿=[3(￿ ￿ 1)] and
￿=[(￿ ￿ 1)] at which expected welfare reaches a local maximum. Thereafter, further increases
in discipline that do not cause spending in a minority district to turn positive must reduce
expected welfare. In the ￿gure, expected welfare reaches a local maximum at ￿ = 46=51.14
Finally, we reach the region of high ￿, where discipline is su¢ ciently strong that the
parties￿promises induce positive spending even in a district that is not represented in the
majority delegation. Throughout this region, ￿ g3, ￿ g2 and ￿ g0 all rise monotonically with ￿ from
levels that are ine¢ ciently small. Thus, expected welfare must be rising with ￿ in the region
of high discipline. As we have noted before, spending levels converge to the e¢ cient levels as
￿ ! 1. Thus, expected welfare asymptotes to the ￿rst-best.
In short, we ￿nd that when political parties have limited ability to pre-commit the actions
of elected representatives, the legislature delivers quite ine¢ cient levels of local public goods
and the outcome can be worse even than if national spending on district projects were im-
possible. At the opposite extreme, when the political parties have full ability to pre-commit
public spending, then the spending level in each district is e¢ cient. But the relationship
between party discipline and expected welfare is not monotonic.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a three-stage model of political campaigns, voting, and leg-
islative deliberations to study the determinants of national spending on local public goods.
The key variable of interest in our analysis is the degree to which political parties can pre-
commit the policy actions of their members during the course of the political campaign. We
assume that political parties are di⁄erentiated by ideology and that the leaders of the two
parties seek to gain majority control of the contested legislature in order to pursue their
ideological agendas. Electoral competition motivates their promises of pork-barrel spending.
After the election, the victorious candidates pursue more parochial concerns, namely to pro-
vide goodies to their local constituents. Thus, members of the majority delegation will want
to steer pork-barrel spending to the districts they represent, regardless of what their party
may have promised. A party￿ s ability to pre-commit to policy re￿ ects its ability to discipline
its members when the party succeeds in gaining control of the legislature.
14More generally, the turning point comes at
￿ =
2￿(12￿ ￿ 1)
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23We conceive of this ability as re￿ ecting political institutions, although we do not model
the institutions explicitly. Rather, we represent party discipline by a parameter that measures
the size of a penalty that the party imposes on its members if they deviate from the party￿ s
campaign platform. We imagine that the party imposes this penalty to preserve its ability to
use campaign promises for electoral bene￿t in future elections. Presumably, the size of the
penalty re￿ ects the degree to which the national party controls resources that are valuable
to the individual politicians. In future work, it would be desirable to model explicitly the
instruments available to the party and their incentives to use them. By doing so, we could
endogenize the degree of pre-commitment ability as a function of more primitive features of
the political system.
Our reduced-form approach yields a very tractable model and some interesting conclu-
sions. We ￿nd that a party￿ s platform, as well as actual spending in districts represented in
a majority delegation, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the parameter representing the
degree of party discipline. At low levels of discipline, the parties promise lavish pork-barrel
spending in every district. If a given party wins in all three districts, the legislature spends
more than is optimal in every district. If the majority party controls only two seats, the leg-
islators allocate even more pork to the two districts they represent, but do not spend at all
in the third district. As the parameter re￿ ecting party discipline rises from these low levels,
initially the qualitative features of the equilibrium remain the same, although the promises
moderate and so does spending in a district represented by a legislator in a two-member
majority delegation.
As discipline rises, eventually the penalties for deviating from the party platform become
su¢ ciently great that the legislators in a two-member majority delegation would not choose
to eschew spending in the remaining district (that they do not represent). For this and
higher levels of discipline, public spending is positive in every district, although greater in
those represented in a majority delegation than in those that are not. Further increases in
discipline cause the parties to raise their campaign promises (from levels that are quite low)
and to deliver greater pork to every district for all possible election results. As the penalties
for failure to deliver on campaign promises become prohibitive, the promised level of spending
per district approaches the socially e¢ cient level, as does the actual spending in every district
after any possible election outcome.
We also examined the relationship between parties￿ ability to pre-commit their ￿scal
policies and the expected welfare of voters. At low levels of discipline, the excessive spending
in districts represented in a majority and the absence of spending in a district that is excluded
from the majority result in a highly ine¢ cient ￿scal regime. Indeed, expected welfare can be
lower due to tyranny of the majority than what would result from a constitutional prohibition
on all public spending on local public goods. As discipline strengthens, promises moderate,
and so does the ine¢ ciency that results from excessive spending. But further increases in
24discipline cause the spending levels to fall to and below the e¢ cient levels, and expected
welfare then falls. However, once discipline is so strict that the legislature allocates pork
even to a minority district, subsequent increases in discipline cause spending levels to rise
again, and expected welfare converges to the ￿rst-best.
Our paper ￿lls a gap in the literature between the pre-commitment models in the Down-
sian tradition and the no-commitment models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and
Coate (1997), and others. Our ￿ndings urge a cautionary note about the use of correlations
in comparative political analysis. The relationship between political institutions and policy
outcomes can be subtle and complex even in a relatively simple political environment.
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